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Abstract
Significance tests are probably the most extended form of inference in empirical re-
search, and significance is often interpreted as providing greater informational content
than non-significance. In this article we show, however, that rejection of a point null
often carries very little information, while failure to reject may be highly informative.
This is particularly true in empirical contexts where data sets are large and where
there are rarely reasons to put substantial prior probability on a point null. Our
results challenge the usual practice of conferring point null rejections a higher level
of scientific significance than non-rejections. In consequence, we advocate a visible
reporting and discussion of non-significant results in empirical practice.
1. Introduction
Non-significant empirical results (usually in the form of t-statistics smaller than 1.96) relative
to some null hypotheses of interest (usually zero coefficients) are notoriously hard to publish in
professional/scientific journals (see, e.g., Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008). This state of affairs is in
part maintained by the widespread notion that non-significant results are non-informative. After
all, lack of statistical significance derives from the absence of extreme or surprising outcomes
under the null hypothesis. In this article, we argue that this view of statistical inference is
misguided. In particular, we show that non-significant results are informative, and argue that
they are more informative than significant results in scenarios that are common, even prevalent,
in empirical practice.
Alberto Abadie, Department of Economics, MIT, abadie@mit.edu. We thank Joshua Angrist, Gary Chamberlain,
Amy Finkelstein, Guido Imbens, and Ben Olken for comments and discussions. A version of this article aimed at
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To discuss the informational content of different statistical procedures, we formally adopt a
limited information Bayes perspective. In this setting, agents representing journal readership or
the scientific community have priors, P , over some parameters of interests, θ ∈ Θ. That is, a
member p of P is a probability density function (with respect to some appropriate measure) on P .
While agents are Bayesian, we will consider a setting where journals report frequentist results, in
particular, statistical significance. Agents construct limited information Bayes posteriors based
on the reported results of significance tests. We will deem a statistical result informative when
it has the potential to substantially change the prior of the agents over a large range of values
for θ.
Notice, that, like Ioannidis (2005) and others, we restrict our attention to the effect of statistical
significance on beliefs. We adopt this framework not because we believe it is (always) repre-
sentative of empirical practice (in fact, journals typically report additional statistics, beyond
statistical significance), but because isolating the informational content of statistical significance
has immediate implications for how we should interpret its occurrence or lack of it. Correct inter-
pretation of statistical significance is important because, while many other statistics are reported
in practice, the scientific discussion of empirical results is often framed in terms of statistical sig-
nificance of some parameters of interest and non-significant results may be under-reported as
discussed above.
2. A Simple Example
In this section, we consider a simple example with Normal priors and data that captures the
essence of our argument. In section 3 we will consider the case where the priors and the distribu-
tion of the data are not restricted to be in a particular parametric family. Assume an agent has
a prior θ ∼ N(µ, σ2) on θ, with σ2 > 0. A researcher observes n independent measurement of θ
with Normal errors mutually independent and independent of θ, and with variance normalized
to one. That is, x1, . . . , xn are independent N(θ, 1). Let
θ̂ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi ∼ N(θ, 1/n).
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θ is deemed significant if
√
n|θ̂| > c, for some c > 0. In empirical practice, c is often equal to 1.96,
the 0.975-quantile of the Standard Normal distribution. Suppose a journal reports on statistical
significance. We will calculate the limited information posteriors of the agents conditional on
significance and lack thereof. These posteriors are the distributions of θ conditional on
√
n|θ̂| > c
and
√
n|θ̂| ≤ c. First, notice that
Pr(
√
n|θ̂| > c|θ) = Pr(θ̂ > c/√n|θ) + Pr(−θ̂ > c/√n|θ)
= Φ(
√
nθ − c) + Φ(−√nθ − c).
Therefore,1
Pr(
√
n|θ̂| > c) = Φ
( √
nµ− c√
1 + nσ2
)
+ Φ
(
−√nµ− c√
1 + nσ2
)
. (1)
The limited information posteriors given significance and non-significance are:
p
(
θ
∣∣√n|θ̂| > c) =
1
σ
φ
(
θ − µ
σ
)(
Φ(
√
nθ − c) + Φ(−√nθ − c)
)
Φ
( √
nµ− c√
1 + nσ2
)
+ Φ
(
−√nµ− c√
1 + nσ2
) ,
and
p
(
θ
∣∣√n|θ̂| ≤ c) =
1
σ
φ
(
θ − µ
σ
)(
1− Φ(√nθ − c)− Φ(−√nθ − c)
)
1− Φ
( √
nµ− c√
1 + nσ2
)
− Φ
(
−√nµ− c√
1 + nσ2
) .
The two posteriors, along with the Normal prior, are plotted in Figure 1 for µ = 1, σ = 1,
c = 1.96, and n = 10. This figure illustrates the informational value of a significance test.
Rejection of the null carves probability mass around zero in the limited information posterior,
1This calculation uses the following fact of integration∫
Φ
(
λ− θ
ξ
)
1
σ
φ
(
θ − µ
σ
)
dθ = Φ
(
λ− µ√
σ2 + ξ2
)
for arbitrary real λ and µ and positive σ and ξ. Alternatively, the result can be easily derived after noticing that
the distribution of θ̂ integrated over the prior is Normal with mean µ and variance σ2 + 1/n.
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Figure 1: Posterior Distributions After a Significance Test
while failure to reject concentrates probability mass around zero. Notice that failure to reject
carries substantial information, even in the rather under-powered setting generated by the values
of µ, σ, c, and n adopted for Figure 1, which imply Pr(
√
n|θ̂| > c) = 0.7028.
Figure 2 shows how prior and posteriors after significance compare as a function of the sample
size. When n is small, significance affects the posterior over a large range of values. When n is
large, significance provides only local to zero information. That is, significance is not informative
in large samples. This is explained by the fact that the probability of rejection in equation (1)
converges to one as the sample size increases. By the law of total probability, it follows that
conditional on non-significance probability mass concentrates around zero as n increases. That
is, the occurrence of an event that is very unlikely given the prior has a large effect on beliefs.
The full information posterior is
p
(
θ|x1, . . . , xn
)
=
1
σn
φ
(
θ − µn
σn
)
,
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Figure 2: Prior and Posterior with Significance for Different Sample Sizes
where
µn =
µ+ nσ2θ̂
1 + nσ2
,
and
σ2n =
σ2
1 + nσ2
.
So, in this very particular context, knowledge of the t-ratio (
√
nθ̂) is sufficient to go back to the
full information posterior. The same is true for the combined information given by the P -value,
2Φ(−√n|θ̂|), and the sign of θ̂.
These results have immediate counterparts in in large samples settings with asymptotically Nor-
mal distributions. They can also be generalized to non-parametric settings, as we demonstrate
in the next section.
5
3. General Case
To extend the results of the previous section beyond Normal priors and data, we will consider a
test statistic, T̂n, such that
Pr
(
T̂n > c
∣∣θ = 0)→ α,
and
Pr
(
T̂n > c
∣∣θ, θ 6= 0)→ 1.
That is, we consider significance tests that are consistent under fixed alternatives and have
asymptotic size equal to α. Let p(·) be a prior on θ, and p(·|T̂n > c) and p(·|T̂n ≤ c) be the
limited information posteriors under significance and non-significance, respectively.
3.1. Continuous Prior
We will first assume a prior that is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure,
with a version of the density that is positive and continuous at zero. By dominated convergence,
we obtain:
Pr
(
T̂n > c
)→ 1.
We first derive the posterior densities under significance,
p(0|T̂n > c) =
Pr
(
T̂n > c
∣∣θ = 0)
Pr
(
T̂n > c
) p(0)→ α p(0),
and
p(θ|T̂n > c) =
Pr
(
T̂n > c
∣∣θ)
Pr
(
T̂n > c
) p(θ)→ p(θ),
for θ 6= 0. So, again, significance only changes beliefs locally around zero. The posterior densities
after non-significance are
p(0|T̂n ≤ c) =
Pr
(
T̂n ≤ c
∣∣θ = 0)
Pr
(
T̂n ≤ c
) p(0)→∞,
6
and
p(θ|T̂n ≤ c) =
Pr
(
T̂n ≤ c
∣∣θ)
Pr
(
T̂n ≤ c
) p(θ)
for θ 6= 0. Typically, for θ 6= 0 (using large deviation results)
− 1
n
log
(
Pr
(
T̂n ≤ c
∣∣θ))→ dθ,
with 0 < dθ <∞. Therefore, Pr
(
T̂n ≤ c
∣∣θ) converges to zero exponentially for θ 6= 0. Let
βn(θ) = Pr(T̂n ≤ c|θ)
be the probability of Type II error (one minus the power). Assume that∫
lim inf
n→∞
βn(z/
√
n) dz > 0.
This rules out perfect local asymptotic power. Then, by change of variable z = n1/2θ and Fatou’s
lemma, we obtain2
lim inf
n→∞
n1/2 Pr(T̂n ≤ c) = lim inf
n→∞
n1/2
∫
βn(θ) p(θ) dθ
= lim inf
n→∞
∫
βn(z/
√
n) p(z/
√
n) dz
≥
∫
lim inf
n→∞
(βn(z/
√
n) p(z/
√
n)) dz
=
∫
lim inf
n→∞
βn(z/
√
n) lim
n→∞
p(z/
√
n) dz
= p(0)
∫
lim inf
n→∞
βn(z/
√
n) dz > 0.
It follows that
p(θ|T̂n ≤ c)→ 0,
for θ 6= 0.
That is, like in the Normal case of section 2, conditional on non-significance the posterior con-
verges to a degenerate distribution at zero.
2For the second to last equality, notice that if an ≥ 0 and bn → b > 0 as n→∞, then
lim inf
n→∞ (anbn) = lim infn→∞ an limn→∞ bn.
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Figure 3: Limit of p(θ|T̂n > c)/p(θ) as a function of q (θ 6= 0, α = 0.05)
3.2. Prior with Probability Mass at Zero
We now consider the case when the prior has probability mass q at zero, with 0 < q < 1. Then
Pr
(
T̂n > c
)→ qα + (1− q) ∈ (α, 1).
Now, the posterior after significance is,
p(0|T̂n > c) =
Pr
(
T̂n > c
∣∣θ = 0)
Pr
(
T̂n > c
) p(0)→ ( α
qα + (1− q)
)
q ≤ q,
and
p(θ|T̂n > c) =
Pr
(
T̂n > c
∣∣θ)
Pr
(
T̂n > c
) p(θ)→ ( 1
qα + (1− q)
)
p(θ) ≥ p(θ),
for θ 6= 0. Now, in contrast to the continuous prior case, significance changes beliefs away from
zero in large samples In particular, if we start with a prior that assigns a large probability to
θ = 0, then significance greatly affects beliefs for values of θ different from zero. Notice, however,
8
that for moderate values of q the effect of significance on beliefs may be negligible. Figure 3
show the limit of p(θ|T̂n > c)/p(θ) as a function of q, for θ 6= 0 and α = 0.05. This limit is close
to one for modest values of q. In order for significance to at least double the probability of θ 6= 0
we need q ≥ 1/(2(1 − α)) = 0.5263. Notice that reducing the value of α does not substantially
change the value of the limit of p(θ|T̂n > c)/p(θ), except for very large values of q. For example,
with α = 0.005 (as advocated in Benjamin et al., 2017), for significance to at least double the
probability of θ 6= 0 we need q ≥ 1/(2(1−α)) = 0.5025. In fact, regardless of the size of the test,
q needs to be bigger than 0.5 in order for significance to double the probability density function
of beliefs at non-zero values of θ.
The posterior after non-significance is,
p(0|T̂n ≤ c) =
Pr
(
T̂n ≤ c
∣∣θ = 0)
Pr
(
T̂n ≤ c
) p(0)→ 1− α
q(1− α)q = 1,
and for θ 6= 0,
p(θ|T̂n ≤ c) =
Pr
(
T̂n ≤ c
∣∣θ)
Pr
(
T̂n ≤ c
) p(θ)→ 0.
Again, non-significance seems to have a stronger effect on beliefs than significance.
Some remarks about priors with probability mass at a point null are in order. First, prior
beliefs that assign probability mass to point nulls may not be adequate in certain settings. For
example, beliefs on the average effect of an anti-poverty intervention may sometimes concentrate
probability smoothly around zero, but more rarely in such a way that a large probability mass
at zero is a good description of a reasonable prior. Moreover, priors with probability mass at a
point null generate a drastic discrepancy, know as Lindley’s paradox, between frequentist and
Bayesian testing procedures (see, e.g., Berger, 1985). Lindley’s paradox arises in settings with a
fixed value of T̂n and a large n. In those settings, frequentists would reject the null hypothesis
when T̂n > c. Bayesians, however, would typically find that the posterior probability of the point
null far exceeds the posterior probability of the alternative. Lindley’s paradox can be explained by
the fact that, as n increases, the distribution of the test statistic under the alternative diverges.
Therefore, a fixed value of the test statistic as n increases can only be explained by the null
9
hypothesis. Notice that conditioning on the event {T̂n ≤ c} (as opposed to conditioning on the
value of T̂n) is not subject to Lindley’s paradox and it may be the natural choice to evaluate a
testing procedure for which significance depends on the value of {T̂n ≤ c} only.
4. Testing an Interval Null
In view of the lack of informativeness of non-significance in large samples (under a point null),
one could instead try to reinterpret significance tests as tests of the implicit null “θ is close to
zero”.
To accommodate this possibility, we will now concentrate in the problem of testing the null that
the parameter θ is in some interval around zero. Under the null hypothesis, θ ∈ [−δ, δ], where
δ is some positive number. Under the alternative hypothesis, θ 6∈ [−δ, δ]. Consider the Normal
model of section 2. To obtain a test of size α we control the supremum of the probability of
Type I error:
Pr(
√
n|θ̂| > c | |θ| = δ) = Φ(√nδ − c) + Φ(−√nδ − c).
Therefore, we choose c such that Φ(
√
nδ− c) + Φ(−√nδ− c) = α. While there is no closed-form
solution for c, its value can be calculated numerically for any given value of
√
nδ, and a very
accurate approximation for large
√
nδ is given by
c = Φ−1(1− α) +√nδ.
That is, controlling size in this setting implies that the critical value has to increase with the
sample size at a root-n rate. In turn, this implies that the probability of rejection, Pr(
√
n|θ̂| >
c|θ) = Φ(√nθ − c) + Φ(−√nθ − c) converges to one if θ 6∈ [−δ, δ], and converges to zero if
θ ∈ (−δ, δ). As a result, the large sample posterior distributions with and without significance
are truncated versions of the prior, with the prior truncated at (−δ, δ) under significance, and
at (−∞,−δ) ∪ (δ,∞) under no significance. If δ is large both significance and non-significance
are informative. If, however, δ is small, we go back to the setting where significance carries only
local-to-zero information. Figure 4 reports posterior distributions for δ = {0.5, 1, 2}, α = 0.05
and n = 10000.
10
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Figure 4: Posterior After a Test of the Null θ ∈ [−δ, δ] (n = 10000, α = 0.05)
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5. Conditioning on the sign of the estimated coefficient
In previous sections we have shown that statistical significance may carry very little information
in large samples. As a result, the values of other statistics should be taken into account along
with significance when the null is rejected in a significance test. As discussed above, in a Normal
(or asymptotically Normal) setting it does not take much to go back to full information (e.g.,
P -value and the sign of θ̂). Here we consider the question of whether minimally augmenting the
information on significance with the sign of θ̂ results in informativeness when the null is rejected.
This exercise is motivated by the possibility that the sign of the estimated coefficient is implicitly
taken into account in many discussions of results from significance tests.
For concreteness, we will concentrate on the case of a positive coefficient estimate, θ̂ > 0. That
is, the limited information posterior under significance and positive θ̂ conditions on the event
√
nθ̂ > c. The case with negative θ̂ is analogous. Using similar calculations as in section 1, we
obtain:
p
(
θ
∣∣√nθ̂ > c) =
1
σ
φ
(
θ − µ
σ
)
Φ(
√
nθ − c)
Φ
( √
nµ− c√
1 + nσ2
) ,
and
p
(
θ
∣∣0 < √nθ̂ ≤ c) =
1
σ
φ
(
θ − µ
σ
)(
1− Φ(√nθ − c)− Φ(−√nθ)
)
1− Φ
( √
nµ− c√
1 + nσ2
)
− Φ
(
−√nµ√
1 + nσ2
) .
Figure 5 reproduces the setting of Figure 1 but for the case when the posterior is conditional on
sign of the estimate in addition to significance. Like in Figure 1, failure to reject carries subtantial
information. In fact, both outcomes of the significance test carry additional information, with
respect to the setting in Figure 1, which of course is explained by the additional information in
the sign of θ̂.
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Figure 5: Posterior Distributions Conditional of Significance and Coefficient Sign
Notice that, in this case, under significance, the ratio between the posterior and the prior con-
verges to
lim
n→∞
p(θ|√nθ̂ > c)
p(θ)
=

0 if θ < 0,
Φ(−c)/Φ(µ/σ) if θ = 0,
1/Φ(µ/σ) if θ > 0.
Without significance, the ratio between the posterior and the prior converges to
lim
n→∞
p(θ|0 < √nθ̂ ≤ c)
p(θ)
=
{
0 if θ 6= 0,
∞ if θ = 0.
That is, as n→∞ non-significance is highly informative. Under significance, the posterior of θ
converges to the prior truncated at zero. As a result, in this case the informational content of
significance depends on the value of Pr(θ > 0) = Φ(µ/σ). If this quantity is small, significance
with a positive sign is highly informative. Unsurprisingly, when µ/σ is large (that is, in cases
where there is little uncertainty about the sign of the parameter of interest), a positive sign of θ̂
does not add much to the informational content of the test. Moreover, the limit of p(θ|√nθ̂ > c)
cannot be more than double the value of p(θ) as long as µ is non-negative. This is relevant to
13
many instances where there are strong belief about the sign of the estimated coefficients (e.g.,
the slope of the demand function, or the effect of schooling on wages) and specifications reporting
“wrong” signs for the coefficients of interest are rarely reported or published.
6. Conclusions
Significance testing on a point null is the most extended form of inference. In this article, we
have shown that rejection of a point null often carries very little information, while failure to
reject is highly informative. This is especially true in empirical contexts where data sets are
large and where there are no reasons to put substantial prior probability on a point null. Our
results challenge the usual practice of conferring point null rejections a higher level of scientific
significance than non-rejections. In consequence, we advocate a visible reporting and discussion
of non-significant results in empirical practice (e.g., as in Angrist et al., 2017; Cantoni, 2018).
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